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IN THE MATTER OF 



FiTZ-JoHN Porter 



BRIEF SUMMARY m REPORT 




01" THE 



II 

BOARD OF OFFICERS. 



Allen, Lane & Scott, Printers, 233 South Fifth Street, Philadelphia. 






6154* 



t 



f\ 



I 



BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST 
GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER, OF WHICH HE WAS 
FOUND GUILTY BY THE COURT-MARTIAL IN JANU- 
ARY, 1863, WITH THE ANSWERS THERETO AND 
REFERENCE TO EVIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES. 

I. That General Porter did not march, as ordered to do, at 1 A. M. 
of the 3Slh of August, 1862, from Warrenton Junction for Bristoe 
Station, but delayed moving for two hours, or until 3 A. M. 

It was claimed on the trial before the court-martial that this charge 
was sustained by the evidence of — 

Captain Duryea O. R., page 115 

Major Barstow O. R., page 111 

Lieutenant-Colonel Myers O. R., page 107 

General Reynolds O. R., page 169 

General Heintzelman O. R., page 82 

General Pope O. R., page 12 

Drake De Kay O. R., page 42 

The answer to this is that the night was so dark, the road was crossed 
by several small streams, the road was in places a newly-made army road 
with stumps in it, and so blocked by wagons in places as to have rendered 
it impossible to march at 1 A. M., and in fact when he did start at 3 A. 
M., his troops did not get out of camp even until daylight. 

The above facts, and the impossibility of marching, were sustained by 
the facts as sworn to by — 

Captain Duryea O. R., page 115 

Lieutenant-Colonel Myers O. R., page 109 

General Reynolds O. R., page 171 

General Heintzelman • O. R., page 80 

Colonel Locke O. R., page 134 

Colonel Martin O. R., page 140 

General Morell O. R., page 146 

General Sykes O. R., page 176 

General Bntterfield O. R., page 185 

General Griffin O. R., page 161 

Captain Nifield O. R., page 122 

Captain Monteith O. R., page 126 

Lieutenant Wild O. R., page 129 

Colonel Brinton , O. R., page 204 

Colonel Clary O. R., page 121 

Note. — The accusations have been put into this simple form instead of the more elaborate 
one contained in the charges and specifications, as being more readily understood. They 
contain the sulistance of all that was charged against him, and of which he was found guilty. 
They are printed in italics. 

Note. — All the witnesses who gave evidence on one side or the other may not be referred 
to. No one can properly understand the full import of the testimony without reading it all 
through. But these references may assist in so doing. 

Note.— The capitals " O. R." indicate the court-martial record ; " N. R." the record of the 
board of officers who recently heard the case. 



2 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN POETER. 

On the recent hearing before the board of officers who met at West 
Point in 1878, new evidence was given on this point against Porter by — 

Colonel J. S. Buchanan N. R., page 602 

Major Duval N. R., page 860 

Corporal Solomon Thomas N. R., page 840 

Brevet Major W. Bullard N. R., page 730 

Lieutenant Charles Dwiglit N. R., page 722 

Private Murray N. R., page 587 

Dr. W. L. Faxon N. R., page 889 

Major Rufus R. Dawes N. R., page 834 

On the hearing before the board, new evidence was given in favor of 
Porter by — 

General Warren N. R., page 15 

General Ruggles N. R., page 271 

General R. C. Buchanan N. R., page 214 

General Patrick N. R., page 181 

General Ruggles N. R., page 271 

Captain Randal N. R., page 

I submit, upon examination of all this testimony, any fair-minded man 
"T"st conclude the darkness of the night and tlie obstructions were such 
as fully justified Porter in delaying from one to three o'clock. 

II. That he did not obey the joint order of the morning of August 
S9th, 1863, to General 3Ic]JoweU. and himself, to move toward Gainesville. 

The witnesses against Porter on this point were — 

General McDowell O. R., page 82 

General Pope O. R., page 11 

General Roberts O. R., page 47 

Colonel Smith O. R., page 68 

Captain Smith : O. R., page 112 

The answer to this charge is that Porter met the forces of Longstreet 
when he reached Dawkins' branch and could not go further. That Mc- 
Dowell took the command as senior in rank, and told Porter he was too 
far out ; that was no place to fight a battle ; that he (McDowell) then 
took Ricketts' and King's divisions off and moved up the Sudley road, 
and thus deprived Porter of the force necessary to carry out the order 
any further, and l)y his course destroyed the binding effect of that or- 
der ; that Porter being too weak in force to attack Longstreet's force of 
25,000 men with the 8000 or 10,000 men left him by McDowell, did all 
he could do, viz., he held Longstreet in check and kept himself in read- 
iness to fall back behind Bull Run, that night, as oi-dered by the joint 
order. 

In this he was sustained by the evidence of — 

General Morell O. R., page 146 

General Griffin O. R., page 160 



~1 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 3 

General Sykes O. R., page 176 

General Butterfield O. R., page 185 

Colonel Locke O. R., page 133 

Captain Martin O. R., page 140 

Lieutenant Weld O. R., page 129 

Colonel E. G. Marshall O. R., page 189 

The new evidence against Poi'ter on this point was given by — 

General McDowell N. R., page 742 

Colonel Sciiriner N. R., page 832 

General Bouton N. R., page 332 

Captain Geeke N. R., page 678 

Captain Runnell N. R., page 677 

Dr.Faxon N. R., page 890 

Private Brahn N. R., page 936 

Robbing N. R., page 845 

Captain Hatch N. R., page 600 

General Sturgis N. R., page 711 

Thomas N. R., page 840 

The new evidence on this point in Porter's favor was given by — 

General B. H. Robertson N. R., page 173 

Colonel Davis N. R., page 389 

Major Earle N. R., page 408 

General Morel) N. R., page 419 

Colonel Locke N. R., page 298 

General Longstreet N. R., page 57 

General Warren N. R., page 15 

Colonel Charles Marshall N. R., page 157 

General Patrick. N. R., page 185 

The most conclusive evidence tiiat Porter was justified in the course he 
took is that General McDowell, when in command of a total force of 
from 25,000 to 27,000 men (half of Pope's army), decided not to at- 
tempt to execute the joint order by marching further in the direction of 
Gainesville, and took King's and Ricketts' divisions of 16,000 to 17,000 
oif up the Sudley road and away from the road to Gainesville. This 
was the abandonment of tlie order, and left Porter no option except to 
remain where he was and do the best he could. 

III. Thai on the 29th of August, 1862, being with his army corps, be- 
tween 3Ianassas Station and the field of battle then pending, and loithin 
sound of the guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a 
severe action, of great consequence, icas being fought, and that the aid of 
his corps iras greatly needed, he did fail all day to bring it on the field, and 
did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy, without 
any attempt to give them battle, and without knoicing the forces from which 
he shamefully rdreated. 



4 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

The evidence on this point as relied upon by Judge-Advocate Holt, 
was given by — 

General McDowell O. R., page 82 

General Pope O. E,., page 11 

General Roberts O. R., page 47 

Colonel Smith O. R., page 68 

And especially the despatch of Porter to McDowell 

and King O. R., page 31 

The answer to this cliarge is : 1st. That Porter was not between 
Manassas Station and the field of" battle, but was on Dawkins' branch, 
which was to the left and south of the line referred to. 2d. That no 
such severe action was being fought there as is involved in this charge. 
3d. That he did not fail to bring his corps on the field as alleged, but 
held it in a position to keep Longstreet's force of 25,000 to 27,000 men 
in check all day ; that he did not retreat, but held the most advanced 
position he had reached that day, without yielding or losing any ground 
whatever. 

In this he is sustained by the evidence of General McDowell's conduct 
as given by General McDowell, O. R., page , General Pope (that he 
stopped all fighting when he came on the ground at 12 M.) C. M. B. 14. 

General Morell O. R., page 146 

Colonel Locke O. R., page 133 

Colonel Marshall O. R., page 189 

General Griffin O. R., page 160 

Captain Martin O. R., page 140 

The new evidence on these points against Porter before the board was 
given by 

General J. C. Robinson N. R., page 833 

General Rosser N. R., page 1152 

Captain McEldowney N. R., page 950 

General Early N. R., page 848 

Captain Benjamin N. R., page 612 

Captain Blackford N. R., page 692 

H. Bouton N. R., page 935 

A. Doubleday (General) N. R., page 688 

Major Troebel N. R,, page 708 

The new evidence given in favor of Porter on these points was by 

General Pope's Official Record of September 3d, 1862, and Janu- 
ary 29th, 1863. 

General Morell N. R., page 968 

General Sykes N. R., page 440 

General Sturgis N. R., page 711 

Colonel Davis N. R., page 389 

Major Earle N. R., page 408 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 



5 



Colonel Randal N. R., page 89 

General Warren N. R., page 15 

General Tower N. R., page 445 

General Mindill N. R, page 845 

General R. C. Buchanan N. R., page 214 

General McKeever N. R., page 

It was proved conclusively that the action during the 29th consisted 
of skirmish fighting, some of it quite heavy during the morning, between 
Sigel's and Reynolds' troops and the enemy, in the neighborhood of 
Groveton, of artillery firing (some of that quite heavy), that at 12 M., 
according to General Pope, he came on to the field and ordered all efforts 
to cease for the time; thai after or about three an attack was made by 
General Grover witli about two thousand men, and that there were^frpm. 
that time on some three or four attacks with not more than three thousand 
to four thousand men at any one time. That these attacks were about 
an hour apart each, and were unsupported by any other simultaneous or 
combined iin)vcment ; that towards sundown General King's division, 
under McDowell, made an attack up the Warrenton Pike near Grove- 
ton ; that no musketry firing was heard by Porter or any one in his 
corps, until this last attack ; that he did not know that Pope was on the 
field until he received the 4.80 desi)atch about sundown, and had no 
reason to sui)iwse Pope needed liis assistance or had any thought of fighting 
a general battle ; on the contrary, from what McDowell had told him 
iu'^the morning — from McDowell's saving he was too for out— this is no 
place to fight a battle ; from McDowell's taking Ricketts and King 
away from\im, and from the tenor of the joint order directing them to 
keep in such a position as to be able to fall back of Bull Run that 
night, he had every reason to believe that there was no general battle 
benig fought, and none was expected or wished for by Pope. 

^s to retreating.— The new evidence offered by Porter utterly destroys 
the foundation of this charge. ^ ^ 

From the time Porter put out his skirmish line beyond Dawkins 
branch on arriving there, it was not withdrawn until 3 A. M. of the 
next day. His artillery maintained its position, and there was no change 
in that of the other troops, except such marching and counter-marching 
as was described in the evidence, caused only by orders for position or 
when movements were made so as to meet movements, or supposed move- 
ments of the enemy. They remained on Dawkins' branch, and stretch- 
ing back to Bethlehem Church until they moved at 3 A. M. of the 
Sdth under positive orders from Pope. 

IV. That while a severe action teas being fov.ght on the 29th of August, 
lS6S,'by General Pope, and beliering the troops of General Pope were 
sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, he did fail to go to the aid 
of General Pope, and retreated away and fell back with his army, and 
left In the disasters of a presumed defeat General Pope's army, and failed, 
Ini any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a 
disaster that woidd have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. 

The evidence and remarks given as to the third charge are applicable 
to this. 



6 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

V. That he disobeyed the order of ^.SU F. 31., of Augxist 29th, 1862, to 
attach the enemy on hisflanh or rear. 

The evidence relied upon by the Judge-Advocate to sustain this 
charge was given by — 

Captain Douglas Pope O. R., page 57 

Charles Durfee O. R., page 208 

General McDowell O. R., page 85 

General Pope O. R., page 35 

General Roberts O. R., page 53 

The answer of Porter to this charge is that he did not I'eceive it until 
about sundown, when it was too late to attack. 

The evidence offered by Porter to sustain this defense was by — 

General Sykes, (sunset) O. R., i)age 177 

Colonel Locke, (between sundown and dusk) O. R., page 136 

Monteith, (about sundown) O. R., page 127 

Weld, (after sundown) O. R., pages 130, 132 

Ingham, (after sundown) O. R., page 199 



The new evidence offered against Porter on this ])oint was by — 

Archelaus Dyer N. R., page 1177 

Duffee ". N. R., page 615 

Captain Pope N. R., ])age 563 

The three despatches brought by McDowell (N. R., page 810) were 
expected to prove that Porter received the order at an early hour ; but 
they ]iroved it could not have been in hand at 6 P. M. 

The new evidence in favor of Porter on this point was given by — 

Colonel Randal, (between (J and 7, growing dark)...N. R., page 93 

Three desi)atches N. R., page 810 

Dyer, Duffee and Pope, were contradicted by 

Wheeler N. R., page 980 

Leachman N. R., page 119 

It was shown on behalf of Porter that since the original trial Douglas 
Pope had stated to several persons that he was lost while on his way ; 
that he came near running into the rebels; that he was two hours on the 
road, and it was nearly dark when he delivered it to Porter. The testi- 
mony of the other witnesses was entirely overthrown on this point, and 
they were proved unworthy of credit. They all said they went along 
the Sudley road, and yet did not see a soldier marching there, when it 
is an undisputed fact that Ricketts' and King's divisions of sixteen or 
seventeen tiiousand men were then moving on that road. 

But the most conclusive evidence, at last, is the despatch fi-om Porter 
to McDowell and King, dated six P. M., N. R., page 810, which bears 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 7 

intrinsic evidence he had not then received the 4.30 order. This was 
produced by McDowell on the late hearing, and is the best evidence that 
can be iiad on this point, supplemented, as it is, by tiie evidence of s :h 
men as Sykes, Locke, Monteith, Weld, and Ingram, and recently by 
Randol. 

But the fiict that the 4.30 order was given under an absolute mistake 
as to Porter's location and his ability to attack the flank and rear of the 
enemy, and also as to the presence of Longstreet's forces, would have 
fully justified him in not carrying out the order. 

VI. That he disobeyed the order of 4-oO P. 31. to attack the enemy, 
and retreated from advancing forces of the enemy without any attempt to 
engage them, or to aid the troops who were a/ready fighting greatly sujie- 
rior numbers, and were relying on the flank attack he tvas ordered to make 
to secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army ; results which 
must have folloived from said flank attack had it been made by General 
Porter in compiliance with the said order. 

This charge is substantially the same as the last, and the evidence re- 
ferred to and the remarks under it are appropriate to this. 

Errors of the Court Martial. 

1. As to Portcr\ location. — They thought he was at least one mile 
beyond Dawkin.s' branch. This would have brought him within the 
enemy's lines. He was not beyond Dawkins' branch, except with his 
skirmish line. 

2. As to the character of the battle. — There was no general battle on 
that day. 

The position, as clearly proven, has been stated, and as every position 
and movement of every corps, every division, every brigade and regi- 
ment, were established by evidence and laid down on the maps before the 
board, the nature of each engagement and its extent was found by them 
to prove that there was no such battle as was described in the charges 
and found by the court-martial. 

3. As to Longstreet's presence. — The court-martial did not believe he 
was present. That he was there with twenty-five thousand to twenty- 
seven thousand men is now shown beyond a doubt, by Longstreet, 
Wilcox, Robertson, Early, Marshall, Blackford, and other witnes.ses. 

4. As to PoHer's retreat. — In this the court were clearly wrong. It is 
shown by evidence that can not be disputed that Porter did not retreat. 

5. As to delivery of 4-30 order. — It is now clear it was not delivered 
until about 6.30 or sundown, and Porter could not have attacked. 
Whereas, the court-martial found it was delivered as early as 5 to 5.30. 

All these mistakes except the last were based upon General McDowell's 
evidence. His evidence before the board shows how utterly he fails to 
sustain the inferences drawn from his former testimony, and in fact, that 



8 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

by his conduct as he explains it, and by his evidence as wrung out of him 
in cross-examination, he disproves wiiat he was relied upon to establish 
in the former trial. 

Bv the new evidence these errors can be corrected, and without any 
reflection upon the court-martial, the report of the board can be sustained 
by relying ujion the new evidence and the maps which are now correct. 

The map before the court was grossly defective, and the marks upon 
it show how entirely wrong they were in the views they adopted in the 
])articulars referred to. 

The court suppo.sed Porter was a mile in advance of his real position, 
that he was near the Warrenton Pike — tiiat lie was so far advanced he 
could readily have fallen upon Jackson's flank and rear — that Long- 
street's force was not on the fiekl — that there was no difficulty in Porter's 
falling upon Jackson's flank and rear at any time during the afternoon, 
and he was especially culpable in not having done so after the receipt of 
the 4.30 order. 

The board in their report have corrected these errors, as will be seen 
by reference to their report. 



REPO RT 

OF 

BOARD OF OFFICERS 

CONVENED AT WEST POINT, IN JUNE, 1878. 



New York City, March 19th, 1879. 
To the Honofdhk the Secretary/ of War, Washinr/ton , D. C, 

Sir : — We, the Board of Officers appointed by order of the President 
to examine the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, late Major- 
General of Volunteers, and to report, with the reasons for our conclu- 
sions, what action (if any), in our o]nnion, justice requires should be taken 
by the President on the application for relief in that case, have the honor 
to make the following report. The Recorder lias been directed to for- 
ward to the Adjutant-General of the Army the printed record of our 
proceeding, including all the evidence examined and the arguments of 
counsel on either side. 

We have made a very thorough examination of all the evidence pre- 
sented and bearing in any manner uj)on the merits of the case. The Thorough 
Eecorder has, under instructions from the Board, sought with great iioni.f;.ii 
diligence for evidence in addition to that presented by the petitioner, j^^^^"" 
especially such as might appear to have a bearing adverse to the claims 
urged by him. 

Due care has been exercised not to inquire into the military operations pare not to 
of the Army of Virginia, or the conduct of officers thereof, any fur- wi?"t was" " 
ther than has seemed necessary to a full and fair elucidation of the sub- "^" y"'^'^"' 
jeet submitted to us for investigation. On the other hand, we have not 
hesitated to examine fully into all the facts, accurate knowledge of which 
seemed to us to be necessary to the formation of a correct judgment upon 
the merits of the case, and to the determination of the action which jus- 
tice requires should be taken by the President on the petitioner's appli- 
cation for relief. 

Note. — The side notes are not in tlie report as made by the Board, Inil liave been added 
in this printed copy to call attention more readily to the siilyects treated of, and the italics 
have also been introduced to show portions of the report upon which special emphasis 
should be placed. 

(9) 



10 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

Benefit of We liave had the benefit of the testimony of a large number of officers 
dencritiKi of t'lB late Confederate army, a kind of testimony which was not avail- 
accurate ^\^\q ^f ([jg time of Gcncral Porter's trial by court-martial. We have 
also availed ourselves of the testimony of many officers and soldiers of 
the Union forces who were present on the battle-field, and of much docu- 
mentary evidence, to throw additional light upon points not made per- 
fectly clear in the record of evidence taken before the court-martial ; and 
we have had the use of accurate maps of the battle-field of Manassas, 
constructed from recent actual surveys made, under the direction of the 
Chief of Engineers, by a distinguished officer of that corps, who was 
himself a partici])ant in that battle. 
Without Without such a map neither the testinumy upon which General Porter 

evMence'"' was couvictcd uor the additional testimony submitted to this Board could 
understood.' have bceu correctly understood. 

The evidence which we have thus been able to examine, in addition 
to that which was before the court-martial, has placed beyond question 
many important facts which were before the subjects of dispute, and in 
respect to some of which radically erroneous opinions were entertained 
by General Porter's accusers, and doubtless by the court-martial that 
pronounced him guilty. 
E-sentiai The rcsult has been, as we believe, to establish beyond reasonable 

iished"be- doubt all the facts essential to the formation of a correct judgment upon 
JonaiJe"" the mcrits of the case of Fitz-John Porter. We are thus enabled to re- 
•loubt. port, with entire unanimity, and without doubt in our own minds, with 
the reasons for our conclusions, what action, in our opinion, justice re- 
quired should be taken by the President on the petitioner's application 
for relief 
Several The evidence ]>rescnts itself under several distinct heads, viz. : — 

w'h^h'evt" First. — The im])erfect, and in some respects, erroneous statements of 
''.^n'ls^usei'f ''acts, duc to the jiartial and incorrect knowledge in possession of wit- 
nesses at the time of the court-martial, and the extremely inaccurate 
maps and erroneous locations of troops thereon, by which erroneous state- 
ments were made to convey still more erroneous impressions. 

Second. — The opinions and inferences of prominent officers based upon 
this imperfect knowledge. 

Third. — Tlie far more complete and accurate statements of facts now 
made by a large number of eye-witnesses from both the contending 
forces. 

Fourth. — The accurate maps of the field of operations and the exact 
positions of troops thereon at different periods of time, by which state- 
ments otherwise contradictory or irreconcilable are shown to be harmo- 
nious, and opposing o]iinions are shown to have been based upon different 
views of the same military situation ; and, 

Finally. — The conflicting testimony relative to plans of operations, in- 
terpretation of onlers, motives of action, and relative degrees of respon- 
sibility for unfortunate results. 
Several A carcfiil consideration of all the material facts now fully established, 

views. in combination with the conflicting or inconclusive testimony last above 
referred to, gives rise to several diverse theories respecting the whole 
subject with which General Porter's ease is inseparably connected. These 
diverse views of the subject necessarily involve, in a greater or less 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 11 

degree, the acts, motives, and responsibilities of others as well as those of 
the petitioner. We have considered witli great care and labor, and with 
our best ability, each and all of these phases in which the subject can be*" P'"^'''* 
and has been presented, and we find that all these possible views of the™""""'"*' 
subject, when examined in the light of the fiicts which are fully estab- 
lished by undisputed testimony, lead inevitably to one and tlie same 
conclusion in respect to the guilt or innocence of Fitz-John Porter of 
the specific charges upon which he was tried and pronounced guilty by 
the court-martial. 

Therefore, while exposing General Porter's conduct to the test of the 
highest degree of responsibility which recognized military principles 
attached to the command he held under the circumstances in which he 
was placed, and the orders which he had received, we are able to take 
that view of the whole subject which seems to involve in the least possi- 
ble degree any question as to the acts, motives, or responsibility of 
others. 

We will now proceed to give, as concisely as we are able to do, a nar- 
rative of the events which gave rise to the charges against Major Gen. 
Fitz-John Porter, omitting the multitude of interesting but unessential 
details and all facts having no necessary bearing upon his case, and limit- 
ing ourselves to a plain statement of the essential facts of the case which 
have been established, as we believe, by positive proof 

While the Army of the Potomac was withdrawing from its position 
on the James river in August, 1862, the Army of Virginia, under Major- Line of Ar- 
General Pope, was ordered to hold the line'of the Rappahannock, and Smf in"' 
to stand on the defensive until all the forces could be united behind that ■^"^" '*''^- 
river. General Pope was given to understand that, when this concentra- 
tion was effected, Major-General Halleck, the General-in Chief, was to 
take the field in command cf the combined armies. On the other hand, 
it appears that Major-General McClellan, then commanding the Array 
of the Potomac, was given to understand that he was to direct the opera'- 
tions of all the forces in Virginia as soon as they should be united. 

It appears that General Pope was notified on the 25tli of August that Gen'i Pope 
an active campaign was soon to be commenced, without waiting for a Aug^asii,, 
union of all the forces, and under some commander other than eiihev oQl^^'^"^ 
those before named. But this information appears to have been of ^^ '"""P"^"' 
secret character, afterwards suppressed, and not made known to General 
McClellan and his subordinates until five davs later, when the order 
appeared from the War Department, depriving McClellan of the com- 
mand of all his troops then between the Potomac and the Rappanannoek, 
although leaving him in nominal command of the Army of the Potomac. 

Thus General Porter, who joined General Pope's armv about that Auhatiime 
time, was left under the impression, which all had previously shared, pos'edope't 
that the operations ot the army were to continue of a defensive charac- of defeDsWe 
ter until all the forces should be united and proper preparations made '=''•■"■="''*'''■ 
for the commencement of an offensive campaign under a general desig- 
nated by the President to command the combined armies. But just then 
the Confederate General, Jackson, witii three divisions of infantry, one 
of cavalry, and some artillery, commenced his movement to turn the 
Union right through Thoroughfare Gap, wiiich gap he passed on the 
26th, and that night struck the rear of the Union army at Bristoe and 



12 CASE OF riTZ-JOHN POETER. 

Manassas Junction. The next morning, August 27tii, tlie Union Army 
changed front to the rear, antl was oidered to move on Gainesville, 
Greenwich, and Warrenton Junction. 
Aiig.27tii, General Porter, with his two divisions of the Fifth Corps, arrived at 
portMito Warrenton Junction on the 27th, and there reported in person to Gen- 
Pope. gj-ai Pope. That afternoon Hooker's division was engaged with the 

enemy at Bristoe Station ; McDowell and Sigel were moving on Gaines- 
ville, and Heintzelman and Reno on Greenwich. Banks was covering 
the rear below Warrenton Junction, and guarding the trains in their 
Engage- movement toward ]\Iaiiassas Junction. Porter was at first ordered to 
Bristoe' move toward Greenwich upon the arrival of Banks at Warrenton Junc- 
tion, but after Hooker's engagement at Bristoe the following order was 
sent him, and he received it at 9.50 P. M. 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
Bristoe Station, August 27th, 1862—6.30 P. M. 
Major-General F. J. Porter, Warrenton Junction, 

Order to General: The ruajor-general commanding directs that you start at 1 o'ldock to-night 

march at 1 and come forward with your wliole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to l)e here 

A'tf' ^"^ by daylight to-morrow morning. Hool^er has had a very severe action witli the enemy, with 

a loss of about 300 killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, l>ut is retiring 

along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and clear the country between that 

place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send him word to 

push forward immediately ; also send word to Banks to hurry forwanl witli all sjjeed to 

take your jdaee at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary on all accounts that you should 

be here- by daylight. I send an officer with this despatch who will conduct you to this 

place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in 

the direction of Be.aleton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad trains 

to this side of Cedar run. If he is not with you, write him to that eflect. 

By command of General Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two 
pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately 
upon his doing so. If Banks is not at the junction, instruct Colonel Clary to run the 
trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and a section of artillery 
with it. 

By command of Cieueral Pope. 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 
Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

Ordershows This order ])lainly contemplated an aggressive movement against the 
movemeDts encmy early on the 28th, and retiuired the presence of General Porter's 
intended. ^Qj-pg^ at BHstoe Station as early as possible in the morning, to take part 
in the pursuit of and attack upon the enemy. 

The order did not indicate any anticipation of defensive action at 
Bristoe, but, on the contrary, it indicated continuous, active, and aggres- 
sive operations during the entire day of the 28th, to drive the enemy 
from Manasses and clear the country. Hence the troops must arrive 
at Bristoe in condition for such service. 
Porter The evidence clearly shows that General Porter evinced an earnest 

earne^stde- desire to Comply literally with the terras of the order, and that he held 

siretocom-a eousultation with his division commanders, some of his brigade com- 
ply. . » . . 

manders, and his staff officers on the subject. One of his divi.sions had 

arrived in camp late in the evening, after a long march, and was much 

fatigued. 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 13 

If the troops marched at 1 o'clock, none of them could have much 
sleep before starting, and, even if they could arrive at Bristoe by or soon 
after daylight, they must be in poor condition for a vigorous pursuit of 
the enemy, who was already some distance beyond Bristoe, But this 
was not regarded by General Porter as sufficient reason for hesitating 
to make the attempt to com])ly literally witii the order. He still urged, 
against the advice of his division commanders, the necessity of imj)Iicit 
obedience. Then, further consideration of the subject disclosed the fact 
that the road was filled with army trains, which had been pressing in 
tliat direction all day and as late at night as they could move, until the 
way had become completely blocked with wagons. The trains of the 
army moving back from tiie line of the Kapjiahannock had been ordered 
to take that road to the number of " two or three thousand." In the 
language of one of the most intelligent witnesses, the mass of wagons 
blocked together at places in the road was "like a lot of ice that jams 
in on the shore." The night had become very dark, or, as testified by 
most of the witnesses, excessively dark. It would have been difficult 
to march troops u)wn a plain and unobstructed road. It was a manifest Manifest 
}>iiysical impossil)ility to march over tiiat road tiiat night, or to remove Pjjy^.'^t^^l,"."- 
the obstructions in the darkness of the night. When this situation was to maich'.Tt 
made evident. General Porter reluctantly consented to delay the move-'^'*'' 
ment two hours, or until .3 o'clock. At that hour tiie march was com- 
menced, but it was found that no appreciable proi::ress could be made 
before daylight. Nothing was gained, or could have been gained, by 
the attempt to move before the dawn of day. It would have been wiser wiser to 
to have delayed the attempt to move until 4 o'clock. ed''u'ntiu''' 

A vigorous and persistent effort to make that march, commencing at "'^'o'''- 
1 o'clock, could only have resulted in greatly fatiguing the troops and 
throwing them into disorder, from whicli they could not have been extri- 
cated until long after daylight, without making any material progress, 
and would thus have caused the corps to.arrive at Bristoe at a later hour 
and in a miserable condition. 

Abundant experience in situations similar to that above described porter exer- 
leaves no room for doubt what General Porter's duty was. He exercised oi^Junary' 
only the very ordinary discretion of a corps commander, which it was ap<i pi'pper 
his plain duty to exercise in delaying the march until 3 o'clock, and in 
his attempt to move at that time instead of at 4 o'clock he showed only 
too anxiuus a desire to comply with the letter of his orders. 

If the order had contemplated, as has been represented, an attack by 
the enemy at dawn of day, then it would have been General Porter's 
duty to start promptly, not at 1 o'clock, but at the moment he received 
the order, so as to have brought at least some fragments of his infantry 
to Bristoe in time to aid in repelling that attack. That was the most 
that he could have done in any event, even by starting the moment the 
order was received, and then his troops would have been in no condition 
for any aggressive movement that day. 

General Porter reached Bristoe Station as soon as practicable with his 
corps on the morning of the 28th, and there remaiuecl under orders from 
his superior commander, until the morning of the 29th, taking no part 
in the operations of the 28th. 



14 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

Eicketts 111 tlie momiiig of the 28tli, McDowell sent Ricketts' division of his 

Thorough- coi'ps to Tlioi'oiighfiire Gap to resist the advance of reinforcements from 
tare Gap on jj^g ,-,j.|i„ bodv of Lcc's armv, then known to be marching; to join Jack- 

morniag of »' •^ ' & J 

28tii. son. Banks was at Warrenton Junction and Porter at Bristoe. The 

ariuy°con- I'^st of the army moved from Gainesville, GreenM'ich, and Bristoe on 
centratedto]\/[jj„gg3ajj Junction to attack Jackson at that ijlace ; but that general 
son. Withdrew his torces during the night 01 tlie 2/th and morning- ot the 

28th, toward SiKlley and Groveton. He was followed by Heintzelnian 
and Reno, via Centreville; and McDowell and Sigel, after having 
marched some distance toward Manassas, were ordered to direct their 
march toward Centreville. In this movement toward Centreville, King's 
division of IMcDowell's corps struck the right of Jackson's force, late in 
the afternoon, just north of the Warrenton turnpike, a mile west of 
Groveton. A sharp contest ensued, lasting nntil some time after dark, 
when King still held his ground on the turnpike. Reynolds was then 
near the right of King, Sigel on his right near the Stone House, Heint- 
zelman and Reno near Centreville; Ricketts, who had been sent in the 
morning to Thoroughfare Gap, was disputing with Longstreet the passage 
of the gap. 
Hope to Thus it was still hoped ti> strike Jackson a decisive blow on the morn- 

son mo^'n-'^ '"g of the 29th, before reinforcements could reach him. In the mean 
ing of 29ih. time the Confederate general had taken up a favorable position a little 
to the north and west of Groveton and Sudley to await attack. 

Under tiiese conditions General l^ortcr, who was still at Bristoe Station, 
received, at (> A. M., the following order from General Pope: — 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

„ , Near Bull Run, August 29th, 1862—3 A. M. 

Porter or- > o i 

dered to Genkral: — McDowell lias intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is imiueiliately on 

move to jj,g right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early 

en rev} . j].^,^^ Majcir-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville, at the fiV.st dawn of day, 

with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you 

should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe eugagemeut is likely to take 

place, and your presence is necessary. 

I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel mid Chief of Staff. 
Major-General Porter. 



Porter Under this order. General Porter marched promptly with his corjis 

moves. toward Centreville. He had passed Manassas Junction with the head of 
his column, when he was halted by counter orders, issued in consequence 
of a grave change which had occurred in the situation since the night 
before. 
Change in King had withdrawn from his position near Jackson's right, on the 
order. Warrenton turnpike, and had fallen back to INIanassas Junction. Rick- 
etts had fallen back in the night from Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville, 
and thence, in con.sequence of the movement of King, had retired to 
Bristoe Station. 
Wayopened Thus the way had been left open for the retreat of Jackson to Tiiorough- 
son'sTetreat fei'e Gap, or for the advance of Longstreet from that point, and ample 
st'^icetTo" ^''^'^ ^^^'-^ elapsed for them to effect a junction, either at the Gap or near 
join Jack- Groveton, before a force could again be interposed to prevent it. The 
op]iortunity to attack Jackson's detached force with superior numbers 
had passed beyond the possibility of recall. 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 15 

As soon as the withdrawal of King became known to General Pope, 
he hastily sent a verbal message to General Porter to retrace his steps 
and move towards Gainesville, and soon followed this\~'°*sage with the 
following order, which was received by General Porter aK d.20 A. M. : 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

Centreville, August 29th, 1SG2. 
Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, upon 0'^" '■> 
Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warreuton turnpike. Be e.xpeditious or Q^j^Q^pgyiuc 
we will lose much. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Under these orders General Porter advanced promptly with his corps, Po^er 
followed b_v King's division, on the direct road from Manassas Junction toward 
toward Gainesville, having knowledge of the military situation as above *''"'"^^'""°' 
described. 

General Porter had met General McDowell near Manassas Junction p^^t^ 
and tiiey had conversed with each other relative to this order, placing ™<^<^'«*i'=- 
King's division under Porter's command. McDowell claims that it was 
conceded that he might go forw'ard and command the whole force, under 
the 62d Article of War, but he desired to reunite all the divisions of his 
corps on that part of the field where Reynolds then was. Hence he 
wrote to Pope on this subject, awaited his orders, and did not exercise 
any command over Porter's corps until after the receipt of further orders 
from Pope. 

When about 11.30 o'clock, the head of Porter's column arrived at Arrives at 
Dawkiiis' Branch, about three and a half miles from Gainesville and g^^'Jj^jj''*' 
nine and a half miles from Thoroughfare Gap, he met the enemy's cav- 
alry advance, and captured some of Longstreet's scouts. The clouds of 
dust in his front and to his right, and extending back toward Thorough- J^e"!!'"''* 
fare Gap, showed the enemy coming in force, and already arriving on the 
field in his front. 

Morell's division was at once deployed ; Sykes clo.sed up in support, p^rce de- 
King's division following. A regiment was sent forward across the creek, p'oyed. 
as skirmishers, and Butterfiekl's brigade was started across the creek to 
the front, and somewhat to the right, with orders to seize, in advance of 
the enemy, if po,ssible, the commanding ground on the opposite ridge, 
about a mile distant. Morell's division, with Sykes in support, was ready 
to advance at once to the support of Butterfield. 

At this stage of Porter's operations, sometime between 11.30 and I2j^^j)„„^ii 
o'clock, McDowell, in person, arrived on the field and arrested the move- f"',™^"-^'' 
ment Porter was making, saying to him in the hearing of several offi- 
cers, " Porter, you are too far out. This is no place to fight a battle," 
or words to that effect. 

McDowell had received, a few minutes before, a despatch from Buford, Buford's 
informing him that seventeen regiments of infantry, a battery, and some ^''^'^ " 
cavalry had passed through Gainesville at 8.45 o'clock, and moved down 
the Centreville road toward Groveton, and hence must have been on the 
field in front of Sigel and Reynolds at least two hours. 

The dust in Porter's immediate front and extending across toward Dust 
Groveton, as well as back toward Gainesville, showed that large forces urge'''* 
of the enemy, in addition to those reported by Buford, were already on en^y'^in 

front. 



16 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

tlie field. The latest information from the Confederate army showed 
the whole force of the enemy within reach of Gainesville by noon on the 
Longstra-t 29th. McDowcU's troops (Ricketts' division and some cavalry) had de- 
to mass h'i.r lay ed Longstreet's advance at Thoronghfiire Gap from abont noon nntil 
Ga'p''and7 tlark on the previous day, 28th. Hence, Lee's column had had eighteen 
houis to hours by the mornina: of tiie 29th to close up in mass near the Gap, and 

march 8 , *' , "^ . . i • i i • i -i i c i ■ 

miles and sevcu hours that morning m which to march eiglit miles and lorm line 

battle.'"'* " on the field of battle. 

Jackson, who had been supposed anxious to retreat, and for whom the 
way had been left open, had not retreated, but was still holding his posi- 
tion of the previous evening, as if confident of adequate reinforcements. 
Sigel's pursuit had been checked where it started that morning, at 
Groveton. 

Head of It was Certain that the head of column of Lee's main army had arrived 

re'ac'iifl™d2 0n the field in front of Groveton at least two hours in advance of thear- 

hoursbe- j.jyjj] gf ^i,g ]^gj^(| ^f columu of Porter's and McDowell's corps, at Daw- 
fore Porter. .,„ ,. ., , -ii/'t? 

kins Branch, and it was so nearly certain that the main body oi Lee s 
army was already on the field and in line of battle as to alxsolutely require 
corresponding action. This was Porter's impression at the time, and 
he conveyed it to McDowell by words and gesture that left no doubt in 
the mind of the latter that he (Porter) believed the enemy was in force 
in his immediate front. 
Only For- In contrast to this cridmt preparation of the enemy for battle, only Por- 
lo'fion^n^ ter's nine or ten thousand men were ready for action, of the thirty-jive tliou- 
?ead°/for°^""''' '"-^'^ '''"'" coiiijMsing the left wing of the Union army. 
action. Banks' corps, ten thousand, was still at Bristoe without orders to move 

beyond that point. Ricketts' division, eight thousand, was near Bristoe, 
under orders to move to the front, but his men were so worn out by con- 
stant marching, night and day, tiiat they could not possibly be got to 
the field even tor defensive action that day. King's division, seven thou- 
sand, was just in rear of Porter, but was so fatigued as to be unfit for 
offensive action, and hardly able to march. 

Thus this long column, stretching back from Dawkins' Branch by way 

of Manassas Junction to and even beyond Bristoe, had struck the right 

wing of the Confederate army in line of battle, while a gap of nearly 

two miles remained in the Union line between Porter and Reynolds, who 

was on the left of Sigel near Groveton. 

Map No. I. The accompanying map, marked Board Map, No. 1, illustrates the 

positions of the Union troops at noon of August 29th, and the probable 

positions of the Confederate troops" at the same time, as indicated by 

the information then in possession of the Union generals. This ma|) is 

not intended to show the actual positions of the troops at that time, but 

to correctly interpret the information upon which the Union generals 

then acted. 

Situation This was the military situation on the Union left and Confederate right 

Dowei?'ar- of t'le field wheu McDowell arrested Porter's advance, and Porter's 

rested For- operations under the direct orders from Poijc heretofore mentioned 

ter's move- 1 . -it-..! ii-, 

ment. ceased, and, uniler new orders just received. Porter became subordinate 

to McDowell. 
Failure to Not Only had the effort to destroy Jackson before he could be rein- 
jack"on. forced totally failed, but the Confederate army was on the field and in line, 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 17 

while the Union army was not. The time to resume defensive action, Defensive 
awaiting tile concentration of the army, liad not onlv arrived, but h&dt^'^Zh.ye 
been too long postponeil. been take" 

On his way to tlie front McDowell had received the following order 
from General Pope, addressed jointly to him and Porter, and Porter had 
received a copy of the same order a moment before McDowell's arrival : 

[General Order No. 5.] 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

r, , », r, „ , r, Centrbville, August 29tli, 1862. 

Generals MeDowell and Porter, 

You wUl please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent Joiot order 
General Porter written orders to tliat eflect an hour and a half ai;o. Heintzelman Sigel 
and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now he not far from Gaiues- 
viUe I desire that as soon as communication is established between tliis force and your 
own the whole command shall halt. It may be nece.ssarv to fall back behind Bull Run at 
Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent 'no 
orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements 
ot McDowell s tnjops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold 
his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's 
flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' po.sition, as I have not lieen able to find out 
where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take 
immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other 
divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If anv considerable advantages are to be 
gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thin" must be 
had in view that the troojjs mast occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run 
to-mght or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving 
in this direction at a jiacc that will bring them here bv to-morrow night or next dav Mv 
own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps or at this place. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major- General Commanding. 

This order and the 62d Article of War made it the duty of McDowell j,,n„^ 
to command the combined corps, so long as they should continue to act'^^ coS- 
together, and General Pope should be absent from the field. In this in-""'"^- 
terpretation of tiie law Generals McDowell and I'orter agreed, and upon 
It they acted at the time. Upon McDowell devolved the responsibility 
of modifying the joint order as its terms authorized, and as the militarv 
situation .seemed imperatively to require. 

The terms of tiie order contemplating tiiat communication should be 
established with the troops on the other road, or, as General McDowell ordeT "' 
interpreted it, that line should be formed in connection with those troops, 
that the whole command should then halt, and that the troops must not 
go beyond a point from which they could reach Bull Run by that night 
or the next morning, and the military situation as it then appeared^'to 
them, was briefly discussed by the two generals. 

The situation was exceedingly critictil If the enemy should attack ,.. .• 
as he seemed about ready to do, Porter's two divisions, about nine thou-"*"^^'-" 
sand men, were all the force then ready to stand between Lee's main 
array, just arrived on the field, and McDowell's long and weary column, 
or the left flank of Pope's army near Groveton. McDowell was " exces- 
sively anxious" to get King's division over on the lefl of Reynolds, who 
then occupied with his small division that exposed flank; and he quickly 
decided that "considerable advantages" were "to be gained" by depart- 
ing from the terms of the joint order, so far as to make no attempt to <.-o 
further toward Gainesville, and to at once form line with the troops then 
engaged near Groveton ; and this departure from the strict letter of the Departure 
joint order was evidently required l)y the military situation as it thenfusMef' 
appeared and as it did actually exist. 



18 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

After this brief consultation, the two generals rode together through 
the woods to the right, about tliree-quarters of a mile toward Groveton, 
and made a personal examination of the ground. As soon as this was 
McDowell done, McDowell decided not to take the troops through these woods, but 
tose'parate', to Separate his own corps from Porter's, take King's division (Ricketts 
Kin' M^d following) around the woods by the Sudley Springs road, and thus put 
Ritketts up them in beyond the woods and on the left of Reynolds. 

eyroa . McDowell then left Porter very hurriedly, announcing his decision, 
as he testified, by the words, "You put your force in here, and I will 
take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged 
at that ])oint against the enemy," or words to that effect. Even the.se 
few words, we are satisfied. Porter did not hear, or did not understand, 
for he called, as McDowell rode away, "What shall I do?" and Mc- 
Dowell gave no audible answer, but only a wave of the hand. In this 
state of uncertainty, according to the testimony of one of General Por- 
Porterto ter's Staff officcrs. Porter sent a message to King's division to ascertain 
whJre'he positively if tiiat division was ordered away by McDowell, and, if not, 
was. iQ give proper orders for its action with his corps, and a reply was re- 

turned by McDowell himself that he was going to the right and should 
take that division with him; that Porter iiad better stay where he was, 
and if necessary to fall back, ho could do so on McDowell's left. 

This testimony has given rise to much controversy ; but, in our 
opinion, the question whether that message was or was not sent is unim- 
portant. If it was sent, it did not differ in substance from the instruc- 
tions which Geneial McDowell testifies he had previously given to 
General Porter, " You put your force in here," &c. Neither could be 
construed as directing what Porter's action should be, but only as de- 
ciding that he should continue on that line while McDowell would take 
his own troops to another part of the field. 

There appears to liave been an understanding, derived either from pre- 
vious conversation or from the terms of the joint order, that when Mc- 
Dowell did get King's division on the other side of the woods, Morell's 
division on the right of Porter's corps should make such connection or 
establish such communication with that of King as might be practicable 
through the woods. None of them then knew how wide was that belt of 
woods, nor what was its character beyond where they had reconnoitered, 
nor whether the ground beyond was in possession of the enemy. 
Movement^ When the two generals had started to take that ride to the right, Morell's 
right. troops had been ordered to follow them, and Griffin's brigade had led off 
after its pickets had been called in. After McDowell took his departure 
this movement was continued for sometime and until Griffin had crossed 
the railroad and reached a point near half way across the belt of woods 
and where the forest became dense. There the movement was arrested. 
This movement might have meant an attempt to stretch out Morell's line 
through the woods, so as to connect with King's on the right, or a com- 
pletion of the deployment for an attack upon the enemy in front. Gene- 
ral Porter explained it as intended for an inunediateattack upon the enemy 
if he found he could keep King in support, and that he only desisted upon 
being informed that King was going away. But the attack would have 
been a rash one under the circumstances, even with King's support. Soon 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 19 

after this, scouts were sent on through the woods to look for King, 
Reynolds, Sigel, or some body of Union troops in tiie direction wiiere ar- 
tillery firing was heard. 

Presently Griffin was withdrawn to the south side of the railroad. The 
enemy's artillery opened on his troops during this latter movement, and 
was replied to by one of Morell's batteries, but few shots being fired on 
either side. Then Morell's division was put in defensive order to hold Moreii 
the ground then occupied and undercover from the enemv's artillery. "'V"*''.^"° 

ml I 1 I 1 y ' aud put in 

1 he scouts sent through the woods ran uj)on the enemy s pickets, and were '•etensite 
driven back. This effort to get scouts through the woods was repeated'""''""'' 
from time to time until late in the afternoon, but every effort failed. The 
scouts were all driven back or captured. As it turned out, this resulted 
from the fact that King's division did not get up on the right of the woods 
at all. That division reached a point some distance in rear of its po- 
sition in the lino about 4.30 P. M., and then, after some marching and 
countermarching, was sent northward to tiie Warrenton pike. Thus the 
gap in the line which McDowell's troops were to occupy remained open 
all the afternoon, and the margin of the timber remained in possession of 
the enemy's pickets. 

These failures to connect or to communicate directly along the front Porter re- 
were reported by Porter to McDowell by way of the Sudley Springs road, fo connect'!'^ 
on which McDowell had gone. The reports were made in at least four 
different written despatches, which have been preserved. The hour was 
named in only one, apparently the latest, sent at 6 o'clock in the evening. 
Two reports — one about 4 o'clock and the other about 6.30 P. M. — were 
sent to General Pope direct. Both of these were received by him, but 
have not been preserved. 

About the time General McDowell arrived on the field at Porter's po- Artillery 
sition, and for an hour or two thereafter, a heavy artillery combat was ji^'d„" e™ 
going on between the Union batteries near Groveton, and the Confederate^""^'"'"! 
artillery. During this artillery combat, and until 5 o'clock, P. M., there "("''fen'ry 
was no infantry engagement, except skirmishing and some short and uni'iiT'"" 
sharp contests between small portions of the opposing forces, and until "^''^.'^'s^et''- 
6.30 P. M., no musketry was audible to any one in Porter's corps. h'^^dh* 

On the Confederate side, as it now appears, Porter's display of troops PorLr /ntn 
— tiiree brigades in line — in the early part of the afternoon, had given ^^"^ 
rise to the expectation of an attack on their right. This having been 
reported to General Longstreet, that commander sent his reserve division 
(Wilcox's) from his extreme left, just north of the Warrenton turnpike, 
to his extreme right on the Manassas and Gainesville road. Wilcox 
reached this latter position about 4 o'clock P. M., and Porter having be- 
fore that time withdrawn his troops under cover, some troops from the 
Confederate right (D. R. Jones') were pushed to the front in the woods 
occupied by Porter's skirmishers, apparently to i-econnoitre. This move- 
ment gave rise to the impression among Porter's officers (Morell's divi- 
sion) that the enemy was about to attack about 5 P. M. 

General Pope having arrived some time after noon, on the field in thepopear- 
rear of Groveton, and General McDowell's column approaching that part 3'^^'^°^,^ 
of the field by the Manassas and Sudley road, an attack was ordered '■'"« '>«««■ 
upon the enemy's extreme left near Sudley, and a written order was sent, '""'°' 
dated 4.30 P. M., to Porter to attack the enemy's right, and, if possible, 



20 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

McDowell liis rear. After some time had elapsed, General Pope ordered McDowell, 
atfack!' '° with King's division and otiier troops, to pursue np the Warrenton turn- 
pike tlie enemy, wiio, thus to be assailed upon both flanks, would be 
compelled to retreat. 
Kearney's The attack Oil Jackson's left was begun by Kearney about 5 P. M. ; 
jlX™'" but the order to Porter was not delivered in time. The messenger did 
^''f^^^Jj^*'- not find General Porter until sunset. Thus, at 5 o'clock, nothing 
notdeiiv- having occurred to suggest to General Porter any change in the ])lan 
teriD"time. indicated in the joint order to retire behind Bull Run instead of giving 
battle that day, the sound of artillery near Sudley, so much apparently 
to the rear of iGrrovetoii, suggested to Porter, who was then at Bethlehem 
Church, that Sigel was retiring or perhaps being driven back, and that 
his artillery was then in a new jjosition near the Sudley Springs road. 

If it was true that Sigel was being driven back, the military situation 
was extremelv perilous, and Porter must instantly do what he could to 
avert disaster. His order to Morell, which must have been issued at 
that instant, shows what he proposed to do. It is as follow.s, viz. : 

Order to GENERAL MoKELl. :— Push orer to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach 

Morell. a road up which King is moving,-" and he has got ahead of you, let him pass; but see if 

you can not give help to Sigel. If you find liim retiring, move back toward Manassas, and, 

should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find 

the direct road filled, take the oiie via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return. 

F. J.' PORTER, 

Major- Geyural, 
Look to the i>oints of the compass for Manassas. 

F. J. PORTER. 

Purpose to This movement would have left Porter with Sykes alone to hold the 
ultllT Manassas road and cover the retreat of Ricketts' worn-out troops, who 
d<med"''*°' ^^^^" wnYQ. strctclied along the road for four or five miles, both toward 
Sudley and back toward Manassas Junction, while Morell should cover 
the retreat of the centre of the army. But now, before Morell had time 
to commence this movement, came a report from him that the enemy was 
coming down in force to attack both his front and flank. Porter 
might in a few minutes have to meet the attack of twenty thousand men. 
The purpose to cover the retreat of Sigel must needs be abandoned. 
Hence Porter despatched to Morell : — - 

General Morell:— Hold on, if you can. to your present place. What is passing? 

F. .7. PORTER. 

Again : — 

General JIorell : — Tell me what is passing quickly. If the enemy is coming, hold to 
him, and I will come up. Post vour men to repulse him. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Major- General. 

Could not ^"fl again, in reply to advice from Morell that they had better retire, 

retire while j^(>_ . "We can not retire while McDowell holds on." 

holds on. Notwithstanding contradictory testimony, we believe it was at this 

time that Porter ordered Piatt's brigade, of Sturgis' command, about eight 

hundred men, to move back to Manasses Junction and take up a defensive 

position to cover the expected retreat. 

* The Sudley road. 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 21 

General Porter reported to General McDowell his views and intentions 
in the following despatches : — 

Generals McDowell and King : — I found it impossible to communicate by cross- Porter says 
ing tlie woods to Groveton. Tlie enemy are in great force on tliis road, and as tliey appear he will re- 
to have driven our forces back, the fire of the enemy having advanced, and ours retired, I treat, 
have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with Mc- 
Dowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artil- 
lery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in 
force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how aft'airs 
are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back ? 

r. J. PORTER, 

Major-General. 

General McDowell ok King :— I have been wandering over the woods and failed to 
get a communication to you. Tell iiow matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force 
in front of me, and I wisli to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I shall have to 
retire for food and water, which I can not get here. How goes the battle ? It seems to go to 
our rear. The enemy are getting to our left. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major- General Volunteers. 

General McDowell : — The firing on my riglit has so far retired that, as I can not ad- 
vance and have failed to get over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall with- 
draw to Manassas. If you have anything to communicate, please do .so. I have sent many 
messengers to you and General Sigel and get nothing. 

F. J. PORTER, 

Mitjor-General. 
An artillery duel is going on now ; been skirmishing for a long time. 

F. J. P. 

General JIcDowell : — Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about Despatch G 
the woods for a time I withdrew him, and wliile doing .so artillery opened upon us. My P. M. pre 
scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I believe some duced be- 
have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, but have not '"'^ Board, 
succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports of scouts, think 
the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this messenger 
came. 1 have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your designs, whether 
you retire or not. I can not get water, and am out of provisions. Have lost a few men 
from infantry firing. 

F. J. PORTER, 
Major- General Volunteers. 

Aug. 29th— 3 P. M. 

But Porter soon found the sounds of artillery had deceived him. The Poiter de- 
renewal of the firing toward Groveton showed that Pope's troops were n'ot"to°re. 
still there. Piatt's brigade was then recalled, and no iurtherpreiiarations"'^''' 
for retreat were made. 

Next came to Porter about 5.30 o'clock a report from the right that 
the enemy was in full retreat, and heavy sounds of musketry soon after 
showed that serious work had commenced near Groveton. Porter ordered oraer to 
Morell to make a strong reconnoissauce to learn the truth. Morell, know- n5°^^'l.e"o„. 
ing the report must be false, at least as to the enemy in his front, prepared noissance at 
to support this reconnoi.ssance with his whole division. While this prepa- 
ration was being made came the long-delayed order, dated 4.30 P. M., to 
attack the enemy in tlank or rear : — 

Headquarters in the Field, 

August 29th— 4.30 P. M. 
Major-General Porter: — Your line ot march brings you in on the enemy's right 4 30 order, 
flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possi- 
ble, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy 



22 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their 
flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all 
the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep 
you in close communication with the right wing. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-General Commanding. 

Notre- Thi.s Order, thougli dated at 4.30 P. M., was not received by Porter at 

ponfrbi Bethlehem Church, before 6.30 P. M. 

fore 6.30. -pjjg evidence before the court-martial tending to show that Porter 

received the " 4.30 " order in time to e.\ecute it is found in the testimony 
of the officer who carried the order, and of one of the orderlies 
who accompanied him. Neither of these two witnesses appears to 
have carried a watch, and their several statements of the time when 
the order was delivered were based on estimates of the time occu- 
pied by them in riding from General Pope's headquarters to the place 
where they found General Porter. One of them at least knew from an 
inspection of the order that it was dated at 4.30 ; he, and probably both 
of them, therefore assumed that it was then that they started to deliver 
it, and adding to that hour the estimated time occupied by them, they 
severally fi.xed the hour of delivery. It is now proved by the testimony 
of the officer who wrote the despatch that " 4.30 " wa.s not the hour when 
the messenger started, but was the hour when he began to write the 
despatch, and con.sequently that it was after that hour that the officer 
started to deliver it. 

It is also shown that these messengers did not and could not, if other 
parts of their own testimony are true, have traveled over the route which 
Witnesses they supposcd they had taken. Moreover, it was proved by unquestion-' 
tlro°nth""able testimony that since the court-martial trial one of these witnes.ses had 
tr^adict™' iM^ide statements and admissions inconsistent with and contradictory of 
themselves, ^jg former testimony, and the other witness con{e.ssed before us that 
recently he had deliberately made false statements in regard to the route 
taken while carrying the despatch. We have therefore felt compelled to 
Their evi- lay thc testimony of these witnesses out of the case. An attempt was 
ken^doJn" made to siqiport these witnesses by the testimony of another person, who, 
as it was alleged, also accompanied as an orderly the officer charged with 
the despatch, but his testimony was so completely broken down by cross- 
examination that we regard it as entitled to no weight whatever. 
Proved to On the other hand, the testimony of General Sykes, Lieutenant-Colonel 
sun'do''wn or Lockc, Captain Monteith, Lieutenant Ingham, and Lieutenant Weld before 
by'syki'!' tl^^ court-martial, that the order in question was not delivered until about 
Locke,Mmi-gmniown, either a little before or a little after that hour, has now been 
ham,' Weld, supported bv a new and entirely independent witness. Captain Randol, 
EaDd° b' ''^ and has been singularly confirmed by the production, for the first time, 
byMcDo'w- of the despatch from Porter to McDowell, dated 6 P. M„ the terms of 
el' di^spatch ^vhich Utterly forbid the supposition that at that time Porter had 

6 r. M., ■ 1 1 '' 1 

now pro- received the order. 

duced. rpj^g moment this order was received Porter sent his chief of staff, Col- 

onel Locke, to General Morell with orders to make the attack at once. 
He then wrote and sent a repty to Pope, and immediately rode to the 
front. On his arrival there Morell had about completed his preparations 
for the attack under the previous order to make a reconnoissance, but 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 23 

darkness had already come on. It was evidently impossible to accora- Porter on 
plisli any good that night, for, even if Morell migiitluive begun the attack over's' 
before dark, kSykcs could not have been got into line after the order was ^"JJ;^(^°'' 
received. The contest at Groveton had already so far spent its force as Pope 
to derive no possible aid from Morell's attack. The order was based 
upon conditions manifestly erroneous, and directed what was impossible 
to be done. To push Morell's division against the enemy in the dark 
would liave been in no sense obedience to that order. Porter wisely too late to 
ordered the preparations to cease, and the troops were put into position " 
to pass the night, picketing in all directions, for Porter had but a few 
mounted men and the enemy had two thousand five hundred cavalry 
near his flank. 

About this time, when darkness had come on, the rear of McDowell'sstniMe- 
column of weary troops were passing l)y the rear of Porter's column, si ill J^","fy''^ 
several miles from their destined place on the field. The Union Army \^°°v^ i"^^?- 

1 • J I "^ i"g rear ot 

loas not even yet ready for battle. Porter, and 

The accompanying maps, marked Board Maps Nos. 2 and 3, exhibit army not 
respectively substantially the military situation at the time the 4.30 P. M. foi'^j^fi^ 
order was i.ssued and that which was then uiiderstocid b_v General Pope 
to exist, as ex[)lained to tiie court-martial upon the trial of General 
Porter. 

We believe this plain and simple narrative of tlie events of the 29th Nothing in 

i o r t G r s 

of August clearly shows the true character of General Porter's conduct conduct to 
during that time. We are unahle to find in that conduct anything sm6- m,',ch It'ss 
jcct to criticism, much /ess deserving of censure or condemnation. condemn'"" 

Porter's duty that afternoon was too plain and simple to admit of dis-p„rt5j..j 
cussion. It was to hold his position and cover the deployment of Mc-''"'5'- 
Dowell's troops until the latter, or some of them, should get into line ; 
then to connect with them as far as might be necessary and practicable, 
and then, in the absence of further f)rders, to act in concert with those 
troops and others to the right. 

If King's division had come up on the right, as was expected, and had 
advanced to attack, Porter would have known it instantly, and tlius could 
have joined in the movement. 

If the main army retired, as indicated in the joint order, it was Por- 
ter's duty to retire also, afler having held his ground long enough to 
protect its left flank and to cover the retreat of Ricketts' troojis. 

Porter did for a moment entertain the purpose of trying to give aid 
to Sigel, who was supposed to be retiring before McDowell had got King's 
division up to his support. That was the nearest to making a mistake 
that Porter came that afternoon. But it soon enough became evident 
that such a |)urpose must be abandoned ; Porter had quite his full share 
of responsibility where he was. 

The preparations made for retreat were the ordinary soldierly disposi- prepara- 
tions to enable him to do promptly what he had good reason to expect hejj.°° 
might be required to do at any moment and must do at nightfall. soldierly 

He made frequent reports to his superiors, stating what he had donetions. 
and what he had been unable to do; what his situation was in respect to 
the enemy in his front and the strength of the enemy there; what his 
impressions were from the sourids of action toward his right ; how he had 
failed thus far to get any communications from any commander in the 



tioos for re- 
reat were 



24 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 



main army, or any orders from General Pope, asking McDowell, who was 
nearest to iiim, for sueli information and his (jMcDowell's) designs for the 
nir/lit ; sending an aide-de-camp to General Pojie for orders and receiving 
no rejjly, not even information that the 4 30 order liad been sent to him, 
and, finally, informing hissnperior's that if left to himself, without orders, 
he would have to retire at night for food and water, which he coidd not 
get where he was. These reports were sent not only frequently, but early 
enough to insure the receipt of ordei'S from Po])e or correct information 
from McDowell, if they had any to send him, before it would be time 
for him to withdraw. All these despatches were sent in the latter part 
of the afternoon. They all indicated a purpose to retire only after being 
assured that the main army was retiring, and tiien to cover the retreat of 
the army as far as possible, or to withdraw after nightfall, as the joint 
order had indicated, if no further orders or information of General Pope's 
]>lans could be obtained. 

There is no indication in any of those despatches, when fairly con- 
strned, nor in anything which Porter did or said, of any intention to 
withdraw until after dark, unless comi)elled to do so by the retreat of 
the main army ; and even then lie was compelled to hold on until jMc- 
DowcH's troops could get out of the way, and that was not until after 
dark, for Ricketts' division was on the road in Porter's rear all the after- 
noon. 
No ihui.giit It is perfectly clear that Porter liad no thought whatever of retreating 
'in^f mm the from file enemy, or of withdrawing because of the enemy in his front; 
enemy. ^^^^.^ whcu the cuemy was reported advancing as if to attack, his orders 
If the enemv is comiuir hold to hi'" " " 



He only iu- 
tenditl to 
7-etire on as- 
surance 
that main 
army was 
rt^tiring, 
and then to 
cover re- 
retreat of 
the army. 



were : 



Assumed 
that some 
order to 
attaclt or 
battle — all 
reverse of 
truth. 



le enemy is coming hold to him." " Post your troops to 
repulse liim." " We can not retire wliilo McDowell holds on." 

(It appears to have been assumed in the condemnation of General 
Porter's conduct that he liad some order to attack or some information 
of aggressive plans on the part of General Pope, or some intimation, 
suggestion, or direction to that effect from General McDowell, or tiiat 
there was such a battle going on within his hearing, or something else 
in the military situation that required him to attack the enemy without 
orders before receiving the 4.30 P. M. order at sun.set. All this was the 
exact reverse of the truth. General Pope's hist order, General Mc- 
Dowell's directions while he was with General Porter, the military situ- 
ation as then known to botii Porter and McDowell, and the movement 
McDowell had decided to make to get his own troops into lino of battle, 
and the state of the action on the riglit of the field, all combined to ab- 
solutely forbid any attack by Porter during that entire afternoon until 
he received Pope's order at sunset, and even that order could not possi- 
bly have been given if the situation had been correctly understood. An 
attack by liim would have been a violation of the spirit of his orders, 
and a ci-iminal blunder leading to inevitable disaster. In short, he had 
no choice as a faithful soldier but to do substantially what he did do.) 
Tlie range of our investigation has not enabled us to ascertain the 
ll?nyai™f ""^soiirce of tlic great error wiiich was committed in the testimony before 
Longstreet. Qe„p,.^i Porter's court-martial respecting the time of arrival of the main 
body of Lee's army on the field of Manas.sas. But the information 
which was in possession of the Union officers at noon of the 29th of Au- 
gust, and afterwards published in their official reports, together with the 



Great error 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 25 

testimony before the court-martial, affords clear, explicit, and convincing 
proof tliat the main body of that army must have been there on the field 
at that time. 

The recent testimony of Confederate officers hardly adds anything to 
the conclusiveness of that proof, but rather diminishes its force by show- 
ing that one division (Anderson's) did not arrive until the next morning ; 
while the information in their possession at that time required the Union 
officers to assume that that division as well as the others had arrived on 
the 29th. Yet General Porter's conduct was adjudged upon the assump- 
tion that not more than one division under Longstreet had arrived on 
the field, and that Porter had no considerable force in liis front. 

(The flict is that Longstreet, witii four divisions of full 25,000 men, Longstreet 
was there on the field before Porter arrived with his two divisions of frontwuh 
9000 men ; that the Confederate general-in-chief was there in person at '^^'^^p^f^"' 
least two or three hours before the commander of the Army of Virg-iniaHsi""'^ 

, *^ . ^ 9000. 

himself arrived on the field, and that Porter, with his two divisions, 
saved the Army of Virginia that day from the disaster naturally due 
to the enemy's earlier preparation tor battle.) if4 30or(ier 

If the 4.30 order had been promptly delivered, a very grave responsi- promptly 
bility would have devolved upon General Porter. The order was based grave re-' 
upon conditions which were essentially erroneous, and upon expectations on™ori'e"'' 
which could not possibly be realized. on''mistake. 

It required an attack upon the enemy's flank or rear, which could not^tt.,ct on 
be made, and that the attackina; force keep closed on Reynolds, who was "-■'"'' i^""* 
far to the right and beyond reach. Yet it would have been too late to my impossi- 
correct the error and have the order modified. That order appeared to 
be part of a general plan. It must be executed promptly or not at all. If 
Porter had made not the impossible attack which was ordered, but a di- 
rect attack upon the enemy's right wing, would he have been blameless 
for the fruitless sacrifice of his troops? We believe not. It is a toell- 
estabUsheiJ military vm.vim that a coij^s commander «.s- 7)ot justifiable in 
making «n apparently hopeless attach in obedience to an order from a 
superior who is not on the spot, and who is evidently in error in respect 
to the essential conditions upon which the order is based. The duty of 
the corps commander in such a case is to make not a real attack, but a 
strong demonstration, so as to prevent the enemy in his front from send- 
ing reinforcements to other parts of his line. 

This is all that Porter would have been justifiable in doing, even if he 
had received the 4.30 order at 5 o'clock ; and such a demonstration, or 
even a real attack made after 5 o'clock by Porter alone, could have had 
no beneficial efl^et whatever upon the general result. It would not have 
diminished in the least the resistance offered to the attacks made at other 
points that afternoon. The display of troops made by Porter earlier in 
the afternoon had all the desired and all possible beneficial effect. It 
caused Long,street's reserve division to be sent to his extreme right in 
front of Porter's position. There that division remained until about 6 
o'clock — too late for it to take any effective part in the operations at other 
points of the line. 

(A powerful and well-sustained attack by the combined forces of Por- 
ter's corps and King's division upon the enemy's right wing, if it had been 
commenced early in the afternoon, might have drawn to that part of the 



26 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

Attack by field SO large a part of Loiigstreet's force as to have giveu Pope some 
deru[e"dr- cliaiice of success against Jackson ; but an attack by Porter alone could 
cumstivnces ijoyc been but an ineffective blow, destructive onlv to the force that made 

would Jiave -, ^ ,i 11 it * 1 tt • a 1 

been not it, and, followed l)y a counter-attack, disastrous totlic Union army, buc/i 
bhlnde?!'^"' an attack, under such circmmtances, would have been not only a great 
crimef^'"'" blunder, but, on the part of an intelligent officer, it would hare been a greed 

crime.) 
court.mar- (What General Porter actually did do, althougli his situation was by 
notS'e* no means free from embarrassment and anxiety at the time, now seems 
condemned (;q l-^^yQ been ouly tiic simple, necessary action which an intelligent soldier 

conduct if , , , . / It.'*. •! t ,i 1 1 !• 1 

understood, had HO choice but to take. It is not possible that any court-martial 
obedient, could have condemned such conduct if it had been correctly understood. 
Unim army On the Contrary, that conduct was obedient, subordinate, faithful, and 
from disas- judicious. It savcd the Union army from disaster on the 29th of August.) 

ter, August ■',_,. , , . "','^. ■ , i ,1 , '..*,., 

29th. This ends the tran.sactions upon whicli were based tliecnarges ot wnicn 

General Porter was pronounced guilty ; but some account of the part taken 
by him and his corps in the events of tiie following day, August 30th, 
which gave rise to a charge which was withdrawn, is necessary to a full 
understanding of the merits of the case. 

At 'i A. M. of the 30th, General Porter received the following order, 
and in compliance with it promptly witiidrew from his position in pres- 
ence of the enemy, and marched rapidly by the Sndley road to the centre 
of the battle-field, where he reported to General Pope for orders : — 

Headquarters Army of Virginia, 

In the Field near Bull Run, 

August 2'Jth, 1862—8.50 P. M. 
Order to GENERAL i—ImiuediateJy upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving 

march to whicli you will acknowledge, you will march your comuiaud to the field of hattle of to-day, 
fleldof bat- and report to iiie in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to 
"^- comply strictly with tliis order, and to be pi-esent on the field within three hours after its 

reception ov after daybreak to-morrow morning. 

JOHN POPE, 
Major-Geiicrtf/ Commanding, 
Majok-General F. J. Porter. 
[Received August ;fflth— 3.30 A. M.] 



sigli 
ful 



At first sight it would appear that in this prompt and unhesitating 
.„. if he"^''" movement, under this order. General Porter committed a grave fault. He 
should have ^as already on the field of battle, confronting the enemy in force, and 
without ex- holding a position of vital importance to the security of Po|)e's army; 
sitllation. while the latter appeared, from the order, to be wholly in the dark re- 
specting these all-important facts. It is true the order was most positive, 
imperative, and also distrustful in its terms. But those very terms served 
to show only the more forcibly that the order was based upon a total 
misai)prehension of the essential facts, without which mi.sapi>rehension it 
would not seem poFsiblethat such an urder could have been i.ssued. The 
well-established military rule is that such an order must never be obeyed 
until the commander who gave it has been informed of iiis error and given 
an opportunity to correct it; but, Mpo?t close e.vandnation, the ojjposite 
view of Porter's conduct under this order appears to be the just one. 
But reasons Porter had re]5eatedly reported to McDowell the presence of the enemy 



jusUfledT in large force in his front. Presumably tli&se reports had gone to Pope, 
obejmgaa ^ ^^g ^£ ^^em had in fact. Porter had also sent an aide-de-camp with a 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 27 

written message to Pope about 4 P. M., and had sent a written reply to 
tiie 4.30 P. M. order, after 6.30 P. M. Tiiese last two despatches have 
not been i)reserved by General Pope, and hence their contents are not 
known to us ; l)ut we are bound to presume that they reported the situa- 
tion as Porter then knew it, and as he had frequently reported it to Mc- 
Dowell, and the last of these despatches, in reply to the 4.30 P. M. order, 
was later than the latest of those in which Porter had spoken of any in- 
tention to fall back. Hence, Porter had already given to his superior all 
the information which it was possible for him to give, and nothing re-p^^j^j.,^ 
mained for him but to obey the order. This movement of Porter's corps ^^rpsp''"- 
on the morning of the 30th was the beginning of the unfoi'tunate opera- Pope's'ieft 
tion of that day. This corps, iBhieh had been protecling the left flank o/dr"wn^"'' 
Pope's army, was witlidrawn from its important position, leaving the 
left wing and flank exposed to attack by greatly superior force of the 
enemy, brought to the centre of the field and then ordered " in pursuit of 
the enemy." 

SPECIAL ORDER NO. — . 

HeadiU'arters near Gkoveton, 

August 30th, 1862, 12 M. 

The following forc-es will be; imraediate'y thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy and P'^u^jo'm^'" 
press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the ^'f 3q,],^^ 
command of the pursuit ; Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton 
turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. The divis- 
ion of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Hay Market road, followed by the corps 
of Major-General Jleintzelraan. The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns 
by Major-General McDowell, to wnoni regulara'nd frequent reports will be made. The gen- 
eral headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnjiike. 

By command of Major.General Pope : GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

Colonel and Chief of Staff. 

Headquarters Third Corps, Army of Virginia, 

August 30th, 1862. 
Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the 
enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's 
division, supported l)y Reynolds. Heintzelman with his corps, preceded by Ricketts' divis- 
ion, will move on your right, on the road from Sudley Springs to Hay Market. He is in- 
structed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which is desirable you should join with your 
right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the head of Reynolds' division, on the 
Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rap- 
idly in pursuit of tlie enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. 
Bayard's brigade will be ordered to rejiort to you ; push it well to the left as you advance. 
Verv respectfully your obedient servant, 

ED. SCHPJVER, 
Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
Major-Generai, Porter, 

Commanding, &c., 

These orders led to an attack upon the Confederate left wing, Jack- 
son's command, made mainly by Butterfield's and Barnes' brigades, of 
Morell's division, and by Sykes' division, which is described as follows 
by the Confederate generals : — 

[Extract from General Lee's report of operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, bat- 
tle of Manassas.] 

Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia, 

March 6th, 1863. 
Sir: — -'' ^' About 3 P. M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of Gen- Lee'^s report 
eral Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line jiushed forward un- of this at- 
til engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce '•'•t^'' 



28 CASE OF FITZ-JOHX POSTER.^ 

and Woody ftnjgjrle ensued. A second and third line, of great strengih, moved up to support 
the first, but in doing so c-ame within easy ran^e of a position a little in advance of Long- 
street's left. He immediately ordered up rvro liatteries, and two others being thrown for- 
ward about the same time by Col. S. D. iree, under their well-directed and destructive fire 
the supporting lines were broken and fell hack in confusion. Their repeated efforts t^ rally 
were unavailing, and .Jackson's troojis being tins relieved from the pressure of overwhelm- 
ing numbers. be<rau to press steadily forward, driving the enemy beffire them. He retreated 
in confusion, suffering severely from our artillery which advanced as he retired. General 
Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command 
against the Federal centre and left. « « s 

I have the honor to be. very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

R. E. LEE, 

General. 
General S. Coopee, 
Adjutant and Inspcctur-General, Ru-hviond, Va. 

[Extract from the report of General James Longstreet, October 10th, 1S62.] 

Lonfretreet's ^ - - During the day Colonel S. P. Lee. with his reserve artUlery placed in the 
.-epon. position occupied the dav previous by Colonel Walton, and engaged the enemy in a vejy se- 

vere artillery combat. The result was. as the day previous, a success. At 3.30 o'clock in 
the afternoon I rode to the front for the purpose of completing arrangements for making 
a diversion in favor of a flank movement then under contemplation. Just after reaching 
my front line 1 received a message for reinforcements for General Jackson, who was said 
to be severely pressed. From an eminence near by. one portion of the enemy's masses at- 
tacking General Jackson wctc immediately within my view and in easy ran<re of batteries in 
that I osition. It gave me an advantage that I had not expected to have, and 1 made haste 
to use it. Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position imme- 
diiiiely and opened. Just as this fire began 1 received a message from the commanding gen- 
eral informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evident that 
the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of 
these batteries, 1 made no novement with my troops. 

[Extract from report of Gem ral Jackson of operations from August 15th to September 5th, 

1S62.] 

HE-iDQUAKTEKS SECOND COKPS, A. X. V., 

April 27th, 1S63. 
.Tackson's Gen'EKAi : — After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the 
report. ^^y_ j)jj Federal infaniry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the 

wood and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack 
to the centre and left. In a few moments our entire line was engaged in a fierce and san- 
guinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed, another took its place and 
pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from 
our positions. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to induce me to send 
to the commanding genera] for reinforcements, but the timely and gallant advance of Gen- 
eral Longstreet on ilie right relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming num- 
bers, and gave to these brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet 
pressed upon the right the Federal advance was cheeked, and soon a general advance of my 
whole line was ordered. s « « 

T. J. JACKSOX, 
L ieutena ni- Generai. 
Brigadieb-Gekerai E, H. Chtltos, a, a. a. Generax, 

Headquarters Pepartment, A, X. V. 

Fjshtinsbr As Loiig-streei? armv pressed forward to strike Pope's exposed left 
Sj-kfZRev-^iug and flank, Warren, with his little brigade, sprung into the srap and 
?„"'f^' breasted the storm until but a handftil of his brave men were left alive. 

saved -,..... 

VnionarmT Then Svkes, with his disciplined brigades, and Reynolds, with his gallant 
Pennsylvania Eeser\^es, seized the commanding ground in rear, and, like 
a rock, withstood the advance of the victorious enemy and saved the 
Union army from rout. 

Thus did this gallant corps nobly and amply vindicate the character 
of their trusted chief, and demonstrate to all the world that " disobedience 
of orders " and " misbehavior in tiie presence of the enemy " are crimes 
which could not possibly find place in the head or heart of him who thus 
commanded that corps. 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER 29 

These events of the 30th of August were excluded from the evidence Erenu of 
before the court-niartial that tried General Porter; but justice requires pona"' 
that thev should be mentioned here ashavina; an important bearing; upon'"'^''!?8<'D 

, • . .. . ... ? 1 1 . 1 ^ - questions of 

tlie question ot anmius whicli was so strongly dwelt upon in the review J't'^'-s an- 
of Porter's case by the Judge- Advocate General. 

The foregoing is the simple history of the part takeu by Porter and his 
corps in the events which gave rise to the following charges and specifi- 
cations, findings, and sentence, and executive action : — 

GENERAL ORDERS XO 18. 

Wak Dep.\rtmest, 
Adjutaxt-Geseral's Office, 

Washixgtox, January 22d, 1863. 
I. Before a general court-martial which conyened in the city of Washington, D. C, 
NoTCmher 27tn, 1S62, pursuant to Special Orders No. 362, dated Headquarters of the 
Army, November 25tli, 1S62, and of which Major-General D. Hunter, U S. Volunteers, is 
president, was arraigned and tried Major-General Fitz-Johu Porter, L". S. Volunteers. 
Charge 1. — "Violation of the 9th Article of War." , . 

Specification- 1st.—" In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, of the sp^ciflca-" 
Tolunteers of the United States, having received a lawful order, on or about the 27th tions. 
August, 1S62, while at or near Warrenton Junction, in Virginia, from Major-General John 
Pope, his superior and commanding officer, in the following figures and letters, to wit : — 

' Headquarters Army or Virginia, 

'August 27, 1S62— 6.30 P. M. Bristoe Station. 
• General : — The Major-General commanding directs that yon start at one o'clock to- 
night and come forward with your whole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to 
be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very severe action with the 
enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and wounded. The enemy has been 
driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassns, and 
clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has 
not joined you, send word to him to push forward immediately ; also send word to Banks to 
hnrry forward with all speed to take your place at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, 
on all accounts, that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this despatct, 
who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road 
from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, that he had 
best mn back the railroad train to this side of Cedar Run. If he is not with you, write him 
to that effect. 

' Bt command of Major-General Pope : 

(Signed) ' GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

' Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
' Major-Geseral F. J. Porter, 

■ Warrenton Jtmotion. 

' P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two 
pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately. 
If Banks is not at the Junction instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this side of 
Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of artillery with it. 
' Bv command of Major-General Pope : 

( Signed i 'GEO. D. RUGGLES, 

' Colonel and Chief of -Staff.' 

Did then and there disobey the said order, being at the same time in the face of the enemy. 
This at or near Warrenton, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 2Sth of August, 1862." 

Specification 2d. — " In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being in 
front of the enemy at Manassas, Virginia, on or about the morning of August 29th, 1S62, 
did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful 
order, in the following letters and figures, to wit ; — 

' Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
' Centkeville, August 29th, 1S62. 
' You will please move forward with your joint commands toward GainesvUle. I sent 
General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, 
and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gaines- 
ville. I desire that, as soon as communication is established between this force and your 



30 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

own, the whole commaiul shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behintl Bull Run 
at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be ko on account of our supplies. I have sent no 
orders of any descri]ition to Eicketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements 
of McDowell's troops, e.^eept what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to 
hold his position on the Warronton jiike until tlie troops from here should fall on the 
enemy's flank and rear. I do not eveu know Eicketts' position, as I have not been able to 
find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell 
will take immediate steps to communicate with General Eicketts and instruct him to join the 
other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If any consideralile advantages are to 
be gained by departing from this order, it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must 
be held in view; that the troops must occui>y a position from which they can reach Bull 
Eun to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is 
moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the 
ne.xt day. My own headquarters will for the present be with Heintzelman's corps, or at 
this place. 

(Signed) 'JOHN POPE, 

Mcjor- General Command ing. 
' Generals McDowell and Porter.' 

Which order the said Maior-General Porter did then and there disobey. This at or near 
Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862." 

Specification 3d. — " In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, having 
been in front of the enemy during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th of August, 
1862, did on that day receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding 
officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to wit: — 

' Headquarters in the Field, 

' August 29th, 1862—4.30 P. M. 
' Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push for- 
ward into action at once on the enemy's flank, antl, if possible, on his rear, keeping your 
right in communication with General Eeynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in 
front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, 
and u.se your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are 
obliged to fall liack, do so to your right and rear, so as to keeji yon in close communication 
with tlie right wing. 

(Signed) 'JOHN POPE, 

Major-Gcncral Commanding. 
' Ma,ior-General Porter.' 

Which said order tlie said Major-General Porter did then and there disoliey, and did fail to 
push forward liis forces into action either on the enemy's flank or rear, and in all other re- 
spects did fail to obev said order. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or 
about the 29th of Aiigust, 1862." 

Specification 4th. — " In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near 
Manassas Junction on the night of 29th .\ugust, 1SH2, did receive from Major-General John 
Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order in figures and words as follows, 
to wit : — 

'Headquarters Army Virginia, 
In the Field neak Bull Eun, August 29th, 1862— S.50 P. M. 
General : — Immediately ujion receipt of this order, the ]>i'ecise hour of receiving which 
you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and 
report to nie in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply 
strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, 
or after daybreak to-morrow mornmg. 

(Signed) 'JOHN POPE, 

' Major-General Commanding. 
Major-General F. J. Porter.' 

And the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter did then and there disobey the said order, 
and did permit one of the brigades of his command to march to Centreville — out of the way 
of the field of battle — and there to remain durins- the entire day of Saturday, the 30th of 
August. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th and 30th 
days of Augu.st, 1862." 

Specification 5th.— "In this: that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at 
or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the night of the 29th August, 1862, 
and having received from his superior commanding officer, Major-General John Pope, the 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 31 

lawful order set forth in specification fourth to tliis charge, (lid then and there disoliey the 
same, and did permit one other lirigade attached to his command — being tlie brigade com- 
manded liy Brigadier-General A. S. Piatt — to march to Ceutreville, and did thereby greatly 
delay the arrival of the said General Piatt's brigade on the field of the battle of Manassas, 
on Saturday tlie 30th August, 1862. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on 
or about the 29th day of August, 18G2." 

Charge II.—" Violation of the 52d Article of War." 

Specification 1st.—'- In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, during 
the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, and while within sight of the field 
and in full hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior 
and commanding officer, a lawful order to attacli the enemy, in the following figures and 
letters, to wit : — 

' Headquarters in the Field, 

'August 29, 1862—4.30 P. M. 
' Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to jiush for- 
ward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your 
right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front 
of us, but can Ijc shelled out as soon as you engage then- tlank. Keep heavy reserves, and 
use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged 
to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with 
the right wing. 

"(Signed) ' JOHN POPE, 

' Miijor-Generiil Commanding. 
Major-Genekal Porter.' 

Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there shamefully disobey, and 
did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy witliout any attempt to engage them, or to 
aid the troops wlio were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying on 
the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to secure a decisive victory and to capture the 
enemy's army, a result which must have followed fnmi said flank attack had it been made 
by the said General Porter in compliance with the said oi-der which he so shamefully dis- 
obeved. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 
1862." 

Specification 2ii.--" n this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being with 
his army corps on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, between Manassas Station and the field of 
battle then jiending between the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and 
within sound of the guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a .severe ac- 
tion of great consequence was l>eing fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly needed, 
did fail all day to bring it on to tlie field, and did shamefully fall liack and retreat from 
the advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them battle, and without knowiug 
the forces from which he shamefully retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of 
Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862." 

Specification 3i>. — "In that the said Majoi--General Fitz-John Porter, being with his 
army corps near the field of i.nittle of Manassas on the 29th of August, 1862, while a severe 
action was being fought by the troojis of Major-tjeneral Pope's command, and being in the 
belief that the troops of the said General Pojje were sustaining defeat and retiring from the 
field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid of tiie said troojis and general, and did sbamefully 
retreat away, and did foil back with liis army to the Manassas Junction, and leave to the 
disasters of a jiresumed defeat the said army ; and did fail, liy any attemjit to attack the 
enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the 
safety of the capital of the country. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Vir- 
ginia, on the 29th day of August, 1862." 

Specification 4th.—" In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, on the 
field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 30th August, 1S62, having received a lawful 
order from his superior oflicer and commanding general, Major-General John Pope, to engage 
the enemy's lines, and to carry a position near their centre, and to take an annoying battery 
there posted, did proceed in the execution of that order with unnecessary slowness, and by 
delays give the enemy opportunities to watch and kiK)W his movements, ami to prepare to 
meet his attack ; and did finally so feclily fall upon the enemy's lines as to make little or 
no impression on the same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and 
without making any of the great i)ersonal eflbrts to rally his troops or to keep their lines, 
or to inspire his troojjs to meet the sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded by the 
importance of his jwsition and the momentous consequences and disasters of a retreat at so 
critical a juncture of the day." 



32 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 



To which cliarges and specifications tlie accuscj, Major-General Fitz-John Porter 
States Volunteers, jileaded as follows : — 



United 



To specification 1st, " Not guilty.' 
To specification 2d, " Not guilty." 
To specification 3d, " Not guilty." 
To specification 4th, " Not guilty." 
To specification 5th, " Not guilty." 
And to the charge, " Not guilty." 



Charge I. 



To specification 1st, " Not guilty." 
To specification I'd, " Not guilty." 
To specification .'id, " Not guilty." 
And to the charge, " Not guilty." 



Charge II. 



FINDING. 



The court, having maturely con.sidered the evidence adduced, find the accused, Major- 
Geueral Fitz-Jolin Porter, of United States Volunteers, as follows : — 



Of the 1st specification, 
Of the 2d specification. 
Of tile .id specification. 

Of tile 4th specification, „ _, . 

Of tile 5th specification, "Not guilty. 
Of the charge, " Guilty " 



Charge I. 

'' Guiltv." 
'Guilty." 
' Guiltv." 
Not guilty." 



Charge II. — Of the 1st specification, "Guilty, except so much of the specification as 
implies that he, the accused, ' did retreat from advancing forces of tlie enemy,' after the 
reeeiiit of the order .set forth in .said .specification." Of the 2d specification, " Guilty." Of 
the 3d sjiecification, " Guiltv, e.Kcept the words ' to the Manassas Junction.' " Of the charge, 
"Guilty." 

SENTENCE. 

And the court does therefore sentence him, Major-Geueral Fitz-John Porter, of the United 
States Volunteers, "to be cashiered, and lo be forever ilisqaalified from holdiivj any office of 
trust or profit under the Government of the United States." 

II. In compliance with the 65th of the Rules and Articles of War, the whole proceedings 
of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been transmitted to the Secretary of 
War, and by him laid before the President of the United States. 

The following are the orders of the President : — " The foregoing proceedings, findings, and 
sentence in the foregoing case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter are approved and con- 
firmed ; and it is ordered that the said Fitz-John Porter be, and hereby is, cashiered and 
dismissed from the service of the United States as a major-general of volunteers, and as 
colonel and brevet brigailier-general in the regular service of the United States, and forever 
disqualified from holding any office of trust or jirofit under the Government of the United 
States. 

"Jmuary 21st, l.si;3." ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 

III. The general court-martial, of which Major-General Hunter is president, is hereby 
dissolved. . 

Bv order of the Secretary of War. 

L. THOMAS, 
A dju tant- General. 
Oflicial : 

Assistant AdjiUant-Ge neraJ , 



Charges and 
.specinca- 
tioDS bear 
no resem- 
bldnce to 



(These charges and specifications certainly bear no discernible resem- 
blance to tlie facts of the ca.se as now established. Yet it has been our 
duty to carefully compare with the.se facts the views entertained by the 



as shown 



n the findings and in the review of the case 



facts as es- court-martia 

tabished. ^y|^jg]^ ^^,^g prepared for the information of the President by the Judge- 
Advocate-General who had conducted the prosecution, and thus to clearly 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 33: 

perceive every error into which the court-martial was led. We trust it 
is not necessary for us to submit in detail the results of this compari- 
son, and that it will be sufficient for us to point out the fundamental 
errors, and to say that all the essential facts in every instance stand out in 
clear and absolute contrast to those supposed facts upon which General 
Porter teas adjudged guilty. 

The fundamental errors upon which the conviction of General Porter Errors upon 
depended may be summed up in few words. It was maintained, and "cUon™e- 
apparently established to the satisfaction of the court-martial, that only ^'^"'J.'^pjj.'' 
about one-half of the Confederate army was on the field of Manassas on5«"'^«"f , 
the 29th of August, while General Lee, with the other half, was still be- As to ciiar- 
yond the Bull-Run Mountains; that General Pope's army, exclusive ofbattwod 
Porter's corps, was engaged in a severe and nearly equal contest with A^n'iJ'a't^ 
the enemy, and only needed the aid of a flank attack which Porter was'"'^''. 3- ^^ 

to Dnint 

expected to make to insure the defeat and destruction or capture of the McDowell 
Confederate force in their front under General Jackson ; that McDowell had reach- 
and Porter, with their joint forces. Porter's leading, had advanced to- jf^jjo^^}]*' 
ward Gainesville until the head of their column had reached a point near J,'''''''''^'' 

1 TTT- -i I 1 p 1 I'*' c* ^ n 1 Porter 10 

the Warrenton turnpike, where they found a division of Confederate attack, s. 
troops, "seventeen regiments," whicii Buford had counted as they retreated '^'^ 
passed through Gainesville, marching along the road across Porter's jj^as'las. 
front, and going toward the field of battle at Groveton ; that j\IcDowell '' Tiiat Por- 
ordered Porter to at once attack that column thus moving to join Jack-niainea 
son, or the flank and rear of the line if they had formed in line, while 'idie^con- 
he would take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and throw JiSt^of"^ 
them upon the enemy's centre near Groveton ; that Porter, McDowell S'";vm|1'^\ 
having then separated from him, disobeyed that order to attack, allowed disobedi- 
that division of the enemy's troops to pass him unmolested, and then order"' s'" 
fell back and retreated toward Manassas Junction; that Porter then J^Jf^f gQj,, 
remained in the rear all the afternoon, listeniner to the sounds of battle "■^'"''^"'t 

ol PortCi 3 

and coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades on the cen- disibedi- 
tre and right of the field ; that this division of the enemy having passed '"'°''' 
Porter's column and formed on the right of Jackson's line, near Grove- 
ton, an order was sent to Porter to attack the right flank or i-ear of the 
enemy's line, upon which his own line of march must bring him, but that 
he had willfully disobeyed, and made no attempt to execute that order ; 
that in this way was lost the opportunity to destroy Jackson's detached 
force before the other wing of General Lee's army could join it, and that 
this junction having been effected during the night of tiie 29th, the de- 
feat of General Pope's army on the 30th, thus resulted from General 
Porter's neglect and disobedience. 

Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors, the following all-impor- 
tant facts are fully established : — 

As Porter was advancing toward Gainesville, and while yet nearly xue Board 
four miles from that place and more than two miles from the nearest ^,'J"^j^*|]'^'^^^ 
point of the Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confed- errors, and 
erate array, twenty -five thousand strong, which had arrived on the field Lcts^s ** 
that morning and was already in line of battle. Not being at that mo- were.'^'^''"' 
ment quite fully informed of the enemy's movements, and being then 
under orders from Pope to push rapidly toward Gainesville, Porter was 
pressing forward to attack the enemy in his front, when McDowell 



34 - CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 

arrived on the field witli later information of the enemy, and later and 
very different orders from Pope, assumed the command, and arrested 
Porter's advance. Tiiis later information left no room for doubt that 
the main body of Lee's army was already on the field and far in advance 
of Pope's army in preparation for battle. General McDowell promptly 
decided not to attempt to go further to the front, but to deploy his col- 
umn so as to form line in connection with (xeneral Pope's right wing, 
which M'as then engaged with Jackson. To do this General McDowell 
separated his corps entirely from General Porter's, and thus relinquished 
the command and all right to the command of Porter's corps. Mc- 
Dowell did not give Porter any order to attack, nor did he give him any 
order whatever to govern his action after their se))aration. 

It does not appear from the testimony that he conveyed to Gen- 
eral Porter in any way the erroneous view of the military situation 
which was afterward maintained before the court-martial, nor that he 
suggested to General Porter any expectation that he would make an at- 
tack. On the contrary, the testimony of all the witnes.ses as to what 
was actually said and done; the information which McDowell and Por- 
ter then had respecting tiie enemy, and ilie movement which McDowell 
decided to make, and did make, with his own troops, prove conclusively 
that there was left no room for doubt in Porter's mind that his duty was 
to stand on the defensive and hold his position until McDowell's move- 
ment could be completed. It would have indicated a great error of mil- 
itary judgment to have done or ordered the contrary, in the situation as 
then fully known to both McDowell and Porter.) 
Popewhoiiy General I'ojie appears from his orders and from his testimony to have 
thrsitua-"*^ been at that time wholly ignorant of the true situation. He had disap- 
tioD. proved of the sending of Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap to meet Long- 

street on the 2Sth, believing that tiie main body of Lee's army could not 
reach the field of Manassas before the night of the 30th. Hence, he 
sent tlie order to Porter dated 4.30 P. M. to attack .Jackson's right flank 
or rear. Fortunately that order did not reach Porter until about sun- 
set — too late for any attack to be made. Any attack which Porter could 
have made at any time that afternoon must necessarily have been fruit- 
less of any good result. Porter's faithful, subordinate, and inteJIigent 
conduct that afternoon saved the Union army from the defeat which would 
othcnoise hare resulted that day from the enemy's more speedy concentra- 
tion. The only .seriously critical period of that campaign, viz., be- 
tween 11 A. M. and sunset of August 29th, was thus safely passed. Por- 
ter had understood and appreciated the military situation, and, so far as 
he had acted upon his own judgment, his action had been wise and judi- 
cious. For the disaster of the succeeding day he was in no degree re- 
sj)onsil)le. Whoever else may have been responsible, it did not flow from 
any action or inaction of his. 
Judgment (The judgment of the court-martial upon General Porter's conduct was 
manTai'" evidently based upon greatly erroneous impressions, not only respecting 
based oner- what that Conduct reallv was and the orders under which he was actine, 

rors, * ^ ^ 

but also respecting all the circumstances under which he acted. Espe- 
characterofcially was this ti'ue in respect to the character of the battle of the 29th 
29th. of August. That battle consisted of a number of sharp and gallant 

combats between small portions of the opposing forces. Those combats 



N 



CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 35 

were of short duration and were separated by long intervals of simple 
skirmishing and artillery duels. Until after 6 o'clock only a small part 
of the troops on cither side were engaged at any time during the after- 
noon. Then, about sunset, one additional division on each side was en- 
gaged near Groveton. The musketry of that last contest and the yells 
of the Confederate troops about dark were distinctly heard by the offi- 
cers of Porter's corps ; but at no other time during all that afternoon 
was the volume of musketry such that it could be heard at the posilion 
of Porter's troops. No sound but that of artillery was heard by them 
during all those hours when Porter was understood" by the court-martial 
to have been listening to the sounds of a furious battle raging immedi- 
ately to his right. And those sounds of artillery were bv no means such 
as to indicate a general battle. 

The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of August have some- confusion 
how been strangely confounded with each other. Even the Confederate "JloT"" 
reports have, since the termination of the war, been similarly miscon- 29'h "nd "' 
strued. Those of the 30th have been misquoted as referring to the 29th, tat str?g^ 
thus to prove that a furious battle was going on while Porter was com- S's 'Jps" 
paratively inactive on the 29th. The fierce and gallant struogle of his°"="'"' 
own troops on the 30th has thus been used to sustain the on'oinal error "ondemn 
under which he was condemned. General Porter was, in effect, con- oneof aif 
demned for not having taken any part in his own battle. Such was theJngor™"" 
error upon whicii General Porter was pronounced guilty of the luostl™"^"'"' 
shameful crime known among soldiers. We believe not one among all the '"' 

gallant soldiers on that bloody field teas less deserving of such condemnaUon 
than he.) 

The evidence of bad animus in Porter's case ceases to be material in Porter's aa- 
view of the evidence of his soldierly and faithful conduct. But it is our'T^''"^^^^ 
duty to say that the indiscreet and unkind terms in which General '"• But"" 
Porter expressed his distrust of the capacity of his superior commander s'lonsTto" 
can not be defended. And to that indiscretion was due, in very great S,aodeTin 
measure, the misinterpretation of both his motives and his conduct' and *'\f'^r 
his consequent condemnation. ftnded ' 

Havingthus given the reasons for our conclusions, we have the honor Justice re- 
_to report, in accordance with the President's order, that, in our opinion, ^nce't'obe"'' 
ju.stice requires at his hands such action as may be nece.ssary to annul ""?""''* 
and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case ""stored as 
of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions SLmtsaf. 
ot which that sentence deprived him— such restoration to take effect from 
the date of his dismissal from the .service. 

Very respectfully, your obedient servants, 

J. M. SCHOFIELD, 

Major- Genercd U. S. Army. 

ALFRED H. TEREY, 

Brigadier- General U. S. Army. 

GEO. W. GETTY, 

Brevet Major-General U. 8. Army, Colonel 3d Artillery. 



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